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Abstract 
This paper examines management whipsawing practices in the European auto industry based on 
more than 200 interviews and a comparison of three auto makers.1 We identify four distinct ways 
in which managers stage competition between plants to extract labor concessions: informal, 
hegemonic, coercive, and rule-based whipsawing. Practices at the three examined auto firms 
vary and change, we find, due to two factors: structural whipsawing capacity and management 
labor relations strategy. In the context of economic globalization whipsawing is an effective 
means for managers to extract concessions, to loosen national institutional constraints, and to 
diffuse employment practices internationally. 
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Since the 1970s production and exchange have increasingly taken place on a global scale, 
facilitated by market liberalization and foreign direct investment by multinational corporations 
(MNCs). It is well known that economic globalization has reshaped collective bargaining by 
intensifying market pressures on firms and workers (Tilly 1995), and that management practices 
within MNCs translate these pressures into changes in firm-level employment relations (e.g. 
Katz 1985; Moody 1997; Mueller and Purcell 1992; Raess 2014). Less is known, however, about 
the role of management in organizing international competition. 
In this article we discuss whipsawing as a technique for managers to extract labor 
concessions using between-plant competition. Whipsawing is usually understood as a negotiation 
practice in which one negotiator plays off at least two other parties against each other to gain an 
advantage (Graham, Evenko, and Rajan 1992). While previous employment relations literature 
has referred to whipsawing in situations when there was a direct contest between two plants over 
production (Turner 1991, Katz 1993), we use the term whipsawing in a wider sense. We examine 
it as a way in which managers ‘stage’ market competition (Brinkmann 2011) across the corporate 
network in the context of production and investment decisions. The various forms of 
management whipsawing deserve attention in employment relations research, because they help 
managers to reduce the constraining effects of national institutions and diffuse employment 
relations practices internationally. 
We examine MNCs in the European auto industry, from the emergence of widespread 
management whipsawing in the mid-1980s up to the economic crisis in 2008. We focus on 
Europe because it is a world-region where some of the most sophisticated whipsawing practices 
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have developed. We examine the American companies General Motors (GM) and Ford, which 
developed whipsawing techniques in the USA (Katz 1985; Moody 1997) and introduced them 
afterward in Europe (Fetzer 2012; Mueller and Purcell 1992). We also examine the German 
MNC Volkswagen (VW), the largest automaker in Europe, where management behavior differs 
due to various within-firm institutions conducive to labor-management partnership (Greer and 
Hauptmeier 2008; Turner 1991), but where nonetheless we observe whipsawing. 
This article’s first contribution is to distinguish between four whipsawing patterns. 
Informal whipsawing is the staging of competition using labor’s understanding that concessions 
are necessary for investment, but without explicit or specific threats. Coercive whipsawing is the 
use of such threats, with a narrow focus on extracting concessions and little attempt to secure 
worker representatives’ cooperation. In the two other patterns, managers also organize 
competition, but try to maintain partnership by influencing labor’s interests and ideas 
(hegemonic whipsawing) or using standardized formal bidding (rule-based whipsawing). 
This article’s second contribution is to identify two factors that explain the observed 
emergence of, and variation in, whipsawing practice. First, the production structures of MNCs 
and market conditions provide management with varying and changing degrees of whipsawing 
capacity. The overall increase in flexibility to reallocate production to different plants allows 
whipsawing to emerge and develop. Second, within these constraints, management pursues 
diverse labor relations strategies. Competition is organized in varying ways in response to the 
simultaneous and conflicting needs to secure partnership with, and to force concessions from, 
organized labor.  
 
The changing conditions and practices of whipsawing 
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In industrial relations the term whipsawing originally referred to union rather than management 
behavior. It has been defined as ‘a bargaining tactic used by trade unions in which there is an 
attempt to spread wage and other concessions from one employer to another . . . A breakthrough 
in negotiations in a lead firm (could) thereby be generalized across an industry or occupational 
group’ (Heery and Noon 2008: 510).  
Labor unions used whipsawing historically to establish pattern bargaining.  Based on the 
US experience of the 1930s and 1940s, Ross (1948: 53-70) points to equalizing tendencies under 
collective bargaining, driven by various ‘orbits of coercive comparisons’, e.g. labor and product 
markets. In the post-war decades, union whipsawing took place regularly across the developed 
world, as unions ratcheted up wages in a context of strong economic growth (Marginson 1988; 
Markovits 1986). Auto manufacturing was an important site of union whipsawing. In the post-
New Deal US and postwar UK, unions would target a particular company and then demand that 
other companies pay according to the new pattern. In the US, the union had the advantage that 
during a long strike at one company, workers at the other companies would continue paying into 
the strike fund; deviation between companies (and within companies) was minor (Katz 1985).  
Similarly, in the UK, Ford workers established a ‘parity campaign’ to bring wages up to the level 
of British Leyland; subsequently Ford was seen by unions as the company that set standards for 
the sector (Beynon 1973). In postwar Germany, where formal sectoral bargaining encompassed 
the entire metal sector, IG Metall would first seek agreement in its Baden-Württemberg district, 
due to the highly organized workforce. This agreement would then be extended to other 
metalworking regions and would also influence bargaining in other sectors (Markovits 1986).  
Employers also engaged in comparisons between plants, as early as the 1970s. For 
example, Ford conducted performance comparisons of its European plants (Beynon 1973), 
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pointing to the productivity gap between British and continental European plants and criticizing 
the regular strikes and wildcat disputes in the UK (Fetzer 2009: 16). However, management’s 
comparisons did not have a strong effect on employment relations, since they took place in a 
context of growth in demand, high plant capacity utilization, international trade barriers, and 
therefore little scope for relocating production. As recently as 1976, even in the US, ‘union 
whipsawing [was] much more prevalent than the reverse phenomenon’ (Hendricks 1976: 78). 
With economic globalization, the union strike threat lost its potency as managers gained 
credible exit options and increased their capacity to whipsaw (Anner, Greer, Hauptmeier, Lillie, 
and Winchester 2006; Raess 2014). Governments gradually opened product markets to 
international producers. Internationalization had a strong regional dimension, especially in the 
European Union, which promoted a wide range of market-making institutional changes over 
several decades, including the free flow of goods, services, labor, and capital (Lillie 2010; 
Höpner and Schäfer 2009). The internationalization of markets made it easier for MNCs to trade 
across borders and invest outside of their home countries.  
Changing market conditions also put pressures on firms. With slowing economic growth 
after the 1970s and increasing international competition, markets for automobiles became 
saturated (Bonin, Lung, and Tolliday 2003). By the 1990s excessive production capacity became 
a serious problem, as underutilized plants squeezed profits or triggered losses, putting jobs at 
risk. For trade unionists, the tradeoff between jobs and pay became acute, making them more 
sensitive to production assignments and investments and therefore susceptible to demands for 
concessions.  
Parallel to the internationalization of markets, globalization altered MNC organization, 
structure, and strategy (Morgan, Kristensen, and Whitley 2001). Facing increased market 
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competition, the two main objectives for MNCs in the auto industry became cost reduction and 
increased product variety (Bordenave and Lung 1996). Foreign direct investments by MNCs 
accelerated in the 1970s and 1980s, and MNC operations became integrated across borders. 
Global manufacturing systems stipulated work organization and production norms in plants 
around the world (Williams and Geppert 2012). Management gradually developed transnational 
production networks and production platforms with standardized production templates in 
multiple plants in different countries. Different models on a platform shared the majority of 
parts, driving down the cost of parts, but differed in terms of outside appearance (Jürgens 1998). 
Some corporate strategies, such as parts purchase and manufacturing systems unfolded on a 
global level, while production platforms were embedded within world regions (Freyssenet and 
Lung 2000).  
The evolving internationalization of production facilitated management whipsawing. In 
one early incident in the US management threatened to purchase new axles from another plant 
unless the local union would agree to concessions. The unions, under pressure to retain local 
jobs, agreed to work rule changes including the broadening of job classifications (Katz 1985: 66-
68). In the second half of the 1980s, whipsawing became widespread at US assembly plants. 
Turner (1991) documents within-country whipsawing to force work rule changes on local unions 
to promote lean production. Plants that did not cooperate were passed over in investment 
decisions, threatened with closure, or closed down.  Although this did not initially break the 
wage pattern, it did decentralize collective bargaining over work rules (Katz 1993). 
Management also began to whipsaw plants across borders (Moody 1997). Babson (2000) 
observed dual sourcing at Ford plants in the US and Mexico, in which labor concessions were 
extracted by playing off plants from both sides of the border. Ford and GM also experimented 
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more widely and forcefully with whipsawing practices in Europe, in the 1980s by pitching 
German and British car parts plants against each other (Mueller and Purcell 1992) and later by 
employing this strategy throughout their European corporate networks (Fetzer 2012, Hancke 
2000). From the 1990s other European auto multinationals followed suit (Meardi 2000, 
Bernaciak 2010, Greer and Hauptmeier 2008). 
The industrial relations literature identifies a number of different management practices 
associated with whipsawing. First, managers engage in benchmarking, the systematic 
measurement and comparison of processes and performance across plants (Sisson, Arrowsmith, 
and Marginson 2003). This can be merely an exercise in data gathering, but can also have a more 
normative or coercive meaning if combined with other whipsawing practices. Second, 
management organizes competition between plants by pitching them against each other in the 
context of production assignments (Mueller and Purcell 1992) and demanding labor concessions 
in exchange for investment. Third, there are differences in how managers stage this competition. 
In some cases managers articulate an explicit and specific threat to shift production if labor does 
not agree to concessions (Babson 2000; Raess 2006; Raess and Burgoon 2006); in other 
instances management does not say this openly (Coller 1996). Fourth, managers introduce formal 
bidding for new production with clear rules and expectations about the competitive assignment 
of investment and production (Greer and Hauptmeier 2008). Plants with a better tender, often 
including higher labor concessions, win the contest. Fifth, corporate leaders seek to legitimize 
their action by influencing workers’ ideas (Ferner and Edwards 1995, Hauptmeier and Heery 
2014, Hauptmeier 2012). For example, managers try to convince workers that the competitive 
assignment of production is necessary for survival in highly competitive auto markets. By 
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reference to these different whipsawing practices we distinguish between the four observed 
whipsawing patterns (table 1) discussed in the next section.  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Mapping Variation and Change in Whipsawing Patterns  
Whipsawing is one way in which managers stage markets and use the resulting competition as a 
tool for coordination and control (Brinkmann 2011, Vidal 2013). Managers engaging in 
whipsawing are not only responding to the pressures of markets; they are also organizing market 
competition through their investment and production decisions, with an aim of extracting labor 
concessions. The emergence and variation in whipsawing that we observe is a function of both 
whipsawing capacities and management labor relations strategies. 
Whipsawing capacity refers to the potential and ease with which MNCs move production 
between plants (see table 2). Parallel and standardized production increases the speed and 
reduces the cost of reallocating production at the end of production cycles. Production platforms 
further increase the flexibility to assign production and allow to shift production at short notice at 
any time during the product cycle. Production can be more easily reallocated between plants 
when plant utilization is low. Companies tend to experience low plant utilization and a 
corresponding profit squeeze or losses when market demand deteriorates and excess supply 
increases. This increases pressures and opportunities for whipsawing and reinforces management 
arguments for concessions.  
  
Table 2 about here 
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Within these constraints, whipsawing practice is shaped by management’s labor relations 
strategy, which we conceptualize as a balancing act between forcing and partnership (Walton, 
Cutcher-Gershenfeld, and McKersie 2000). Forcing is the use of the unilateral managerial 
prerogative to extract concessions, and is always to some degree present due to needs for reduced 
costs and increased productivity. Partnership is also always to some extent present due to the 
need to secure worker consent, improve quality, and maintain stability. These two requirements 
are often in conflict with one another, for example, when forcing undermines labor-management 
partnership. But they can also complement each other, for example, under ‘productivity 
coalitions’ (Windolf 1989), when local labor-management partnership facilitates concessions in 
the face of European-level management forcing strategies. We differentiates between four 
different degrees in our sample: emphasis on forcing (when management uses boldly its power to 
extract concessions), emphasis on partnership (when management focuses on gaining 
productivity gains through collaboration with labor), simultaneous forcing and partnership (when 
management strikes a balance between both approaches) and strong partnership (when 
management integrates labor in decision-making processes).2 The varying management strategies 
and whipsawing capacities result in the following whipsawing patterns.  
Informal whipsawing is a type of whipsawing where management does not explicitly 
threaten labor with the withdrawal or withholding of production (Coller 1996). However, 
management might still communicate to labor in an informal manner that production allocations 
are coming up within the company. Since production may go to another plant, these discussions 
                                                 
2
 Another possibility is ‘strong forcing’, in which management ramps up its whipsawing activities by breaking the 
union in one or more locations. While union busting is well documented internationally, we did not observe such 
‘strong forcing’ in our whipsawing cases.  
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trigger labor concerns, especially in the context of excess capacity and underutilized plants. 
Subsequent negotiations between management and labor result in an exchange of labor 
concessions for production. Managers have an emphasis on partnership and avoid undermining 
existing labor-management collaborations. While managers may lack the intention or capacity to 
move production elsewhere – and we observe informal whipsawing most commonly under 
medium whipsawing capacity – it is difficult for worker representatives to assess this, even with 
statutory rights to access corporate information.  
Coercive whipsawing, by contrast, is explicit and specific. There remains no doubt about 
the intentions of management or its capacity to follow through on disinvestment threats. 
Management sets different plants in competition to each other, threatening the affected 
workforces with the assignment of car production to another plant if labor does not agree to 
sufficient concessions. In some instances, management only negotiates one round of concessions 
at each plant and subsequently assigns production; in others, management uses concessions at 
one plant to extract increasing concessions at other plants. This back-and-forth between plants is 
what the literal meaning of whipsawing suggests. The correspondence between the extent of 
labor concessions and production assignments is often unclear. Because management prerogative 
is exercised blatantly and unilaterally, coercive whipsawing has the greatest potential to 
undermine labor-management partnership.  
Rule-based whipsawing is a standardized competitive procedure for the allocation of 
production and requires a high whipsawing capacity. By introducing rules and seeking to 
organize the process in a fair and transparent manner, managers try to avoid the potential 
negative effects of coercive whipsawing and maintain labor-management cooperation, but 
simultaneously try to extract concessions. Before production of a new car model begins, 
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management initiates a formal bidding process between the plants of a given production 
platform. Each plant submits a tender, and the one with the highest labor concessions receives 
the highest share of the work or exclusive production of a model. In effect, management creates a 
within-company market for the allocation of production (Hauptmeier 2011).  
Hegemonic whipsawing only occurs where labor is extensively integrated into 
management decision making processes. Giving labor real responsibility in governing the 
company tends to produce a ‘responsible’ labor ideology, which facilitates management attempts 
to convince labor that internal competition is necessary to survive in the context of cut-throat 
price-based product competition. Management also argues that the competitive assignment of 
production will help to secure jobs and production assignments from headquarters. Thus, 
management influences worker representatives’ ideas to win their acceptance for the competitive 
assignment of new production. This allows the extraction of labor concessions using explicit exit 
threats without undercutting management’s legitimacy in the workplace.  
There must be at least a medium level of whipsawing capacity for there to be whipsawing 
of any kind, and only under high capacity do we see sophisticated rule-based and hegemonic 
forms of whipsawing. At any particular level of whipsawing capacity, however, managers 
organize whipsawing in varying ways, depending on the mix of partnership and forcing found in 
their labor relations strategies.  
 
Methods and Data 
We examine the European auto industry, because it is here that whipsawing practices 
have become common and varied. We use qualitative data on the European operations of Ford, 
GM and VW. Data collection took place between 2002 and 2010 and included more than 200 
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interviews. We interviewed auto managers at European and global headquarters and at the local 
plant level in the USA, Germany and Spain. We triangulated this data on management by 
interviewing actors with a distinct perspective such as works councils, labor representatives, 
dissidents (activists outside formal labor representation bodies), industry experts and European 
Works Councils (EWCs) representatives from the United Kingdom (UK), Belgium, Poland, 
Sweden, Russia, Germany and Spain. As the recollection of interviewees of historical events can 
be incomplete or biased, we also relied on archival data such as corporate newsletters, press 
releases and magazines as well as leaflet archives of labor unions, which helped to reconstruct 
what the actors thought and motivated at the respective moments in time. Further information 
were gathered from web pages and newspapers. The company case studies cover the period from 
the mid-1980s to the 2008 economic crisis, allowing us to assess sequences of whipsawing 
episodes and therefore change over time. The episodes have a focus on assembly production, but 
also include parts plants where they shed light on the development of whipsawing practices in 
the firm as a whole. In each case we explored different patterns of whipsawing practices and 
corresponding explanatory factors. The emerging whipsawing categories and explanatory factors 
from the data were subsequently developed and consolidated in relation to previous literature on 
labor competition, corporate strategies and MNCs.  
 
Ford 
At Ford, following incidents of coercive whipsawing in the 1980s, informal whipsawing became 
the dominant pattern. Management usually refrained from coercive whipsawing practices with 
the aim of avoiding conflict with labor and nurturing cooperation. Management made labor 
aware of upcoming production decisions within Europe, and trade unionists initiated negotiations 
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over production allocation, which then led to labor concessions. Management only turned to 
coercive whipsawing when it faced local industrial action in Spain, but subsequently returned to 
a more informal approach and aimed to maintain collaborative employment relations, which it 
regarded as a precondition for producing high-quality cars.  
Ford was one of the first MNCs to develop an integrated European operation. Ford of 
Europe was founded in 1967 with headquarters in Warley, Essex (UK). Henceforth, the 
European headquarters oversaw the two primary, previously independent, subsidiaries in 
Germany and the UK. Ford Germany had its main production sites in Cologne and a plant in 
Genk, Belgium, which was also part of the German operation. Ford UK’s assembly plants were 
located in Halewood, Dagenham and Southampton. In addition, Ford owned an assembly plant in 
Azambuja (Portugal). Ford’s European headquarters orchestrated the expansion of production in 
Europe in the 1970s by building assembly plants in Saarlouis (Germany) and Valencia (Spain) 
(Fetzer 2012).   
In the 1980s, Ford experimented more widely with whipsawing practices in the context of 
excess production capacities in Europe (Bonin, Lung, and Tolliday 2003: 94). In 1985, Ford 
cited high labor costs in Germany as an important factor in a possible relocation of engine 
production to the UK. German works councilors only averted disinvestment by negotiating a cost 
reduction agreement with local management (Fetzer 2009:19).  
In the late 1980s, management put the Dagenham plant on notice, presenting productivity 
comparisons that showed the plant lagging behind its European competitors. It took 59 hours to 
assemble a Fiesta in Dagenham, while it took 33 hours in Cologne and 35 hours in Valencia. In 
addition, it required 67 hours to produce the Sierra in Dagenham in comparison to 40 hours in 
Genk (Bonin, Lung, and Tolliday 2003: 101). As a consequence, Ford concentrated Sierra 
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production in Genk, and management warned the Dagenham unions that the successor model, 
the Mondeo, would be also sourced to the Genk plant if labor conflict and productivity did not 
improve. Parallel production in different plants made such coercive whipsawing practices 
possible.  
Ford’s whipsawing capacity increased in Europe during the 1990s, when it expanded 
production by creating an assembly joint-venture with VW in Setubal (Portugal) and opening 
assembly plants in Plonsk (Poland) and Obchuk (Belarus). The Valencia factory became the ‘flex 
plant’ capable of producing all Ford car models, and thus could easily take on additional 
production when market conditions required (union interview, Spain, 26.4.2006). The 
standardization and integration of production was advanced through the development of 
production platforms (implemented in the second half of the 1990s), which increased 
management’s flexibility to reassign production.  
Despite this capacity, Ford mostly relied on informal whipsawing in this period. In the 
context of implementing lean production, management valued partnership with worker 
representatives and regarded it as an important element of running their plants productively 
(management interview, Germany, 16.11.2005). Ford did not want to endanger labor-
management partnership through excessive forcing strategies. Whipsawing began to work in a 
more subtle way. For example, when Ford Germany was hit by the 1993 recession, management 
sought to negotiate a company-level agreement to cope with the crisis and reduce labor costs. 
Management put pressure on the works council by presenting benchmarking data, demonstrating 
that each car produced was 516 US dollars cheaper in Valencia, but did not explicitly threaten to 
shift production elsewhere (Ford Works Council 1993).  
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It was the head of the German works council, Wilfried Kuckelkorn, who demanded 
production assignments for the German plants in return for concessions. He realized that in an 
increasingly tight product market only sufficient production assignments would secure jobs and 
previous labor gains. The resulting ‘Investment Security Agreement’ stipulated production 
assignment for the German plants until 2000 and an annual labor cost reduction of 140 million 
German marks (works council interview, Germany, 24.6.2005).  
Similar negotiations took place in 1997. German works councilors were made aware by 
management that new production assignments were imminent. In a meeting with the worldwide 
CEO of Ford, Kuckelkorn demanded production assignments and signaled that he would be 
willing to negotiate labor concessions. This initial conversation triggered negotiations at Ford 
Germany that resulted in another agreement that traded off labor concessions for production 
assignments in Germany until 2002 (Ford 1997). This assignment had severe consequences for 
the British unions during the next downtown of the market, at the end of the 1990s. Ford was 
under pressure to reduce production capacity. Since production was already promised to German 
plants, Ford decided to shut down car production at Dagenham, which meant discontinuing ‘blue 
oval’ car production in the UK after more than 80 years.  
At the Valencia plant in Spain whipsawing practices only began to matter for 
employment relations in the late 1990s. Whipsawing arrived relatively late because the Valencia 
plant was one of the most productive assembly plants in Europe and had operated in the growing 
Spanish auto market. However, management became concerned with growing labor costs, which 
led to a bitter eleven-month collective bargaining conflict in 1998. Management responded to 
union strike pressure by threatening to transfer Focus production from Valencia to Saarlouis 
(Artiles 2002b). However, German works councilors refused extra work to break the strike in 
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Spain. In subsequent negotiations, headquarters in Detroit got directly involved in the conflict 
via a video-conference. The CEO urged the Spanish unions to agree to the suggested changes 
and called the trade unionists ‘pirates.’ He threatened to close the Valencia plant, not right away, 
but gradually through the assignment of new production elsewhere (Hauptmeier 2012).  
Shortly thereafter, management and labor agreed on a compromise. After reflecting on 
the negotiation process, management decided that all future production assignments would only 
take place following a collective bargaining round, and not before as had happened in 1998. 
Management’s view was that this would increase pressure on labor to find a reasonable 
compromise in negotiations (management interview, Spain, 15.5.2006). 
At the end of the 1990s, Ford Europe’s economic problems intensified. Ford made 
significant losses in 1999, in part due to overcapacity, and launched an unprecedented 
retrenchment program in Europe with the aims of saving one billion dollars annually and 
matching production capacity with sales (Automotive Intelligence News 2000). Besides the 
above-mentioned termination of car production at Dagenham, Ford sold the Azambuja plant 
(Portugal) to GM, closed the Plonsk plant (Poland), sold its share of a joint-venture in Setubal 
(Portugal) and stopped car production in Obchuk (Belarus), but also opened new assembly plants 
in St. Petersburg (Russia) and Kocaeli (Turkey). The outcome was a significantly changed 
manufacturing footprint with car production concentrated in fewer locations.  
In the 2000s, the primary competition for new car production took place between 
German, Belgian and Spanish plants. For example, in 2006, the German works council worked to 
secure long-term production guarantees and investments by offering far-reaching concessions, 
including the introduction of a lower-tier collective bargaining agreement and a wage cut to the 
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level of the sectoral collective bargaining agreement. In return, the Cologne and Saarlouis plants 
secured production assignments until 2011 (Ford Works Council 2006).  
Concerned that these production assignments would make their jobs vulnerable, Spanish 
unions forcefully demanded production assignments. Labor representatives from the Valencia 
plants traveled twice to the European headquarters in Cologne and demanded production 
assignments from the CEO of Ford Europe (union interview, Spain, 27.4.2006). Initially 
management was reluctant due to the difficulties of predicting future production levels, but it 
eventually negotiated. Because Valencia was a flex plant, management agreed to production 
levels rather than specific products. In return, labor agreed to concessions.  
Labor initiated negotiations in both Germany and Spain, with the intention of exchanging 
concessions for production assignments in the face of saturated product markets and production 
overcapacity. The pattern of informal whipsawing thus remained dominant.  
 
General Motors 
At GM whipsawing practices progressed from informal to coercive whipsawing and then to 
formal bidding. Initially, GM management used productivity comparisons and informal 
whipsawing to extract concessions, and then with a greater maturity of its production platforms 
and the expansion of its European production network, pitted plants directly against each other in 
competition to extract concessions. In response to local-level labor conflicts and increasing 
transnational worker cooperation within the EWC, management sought to increase the legitimacy 
of whipsawing by introducing a formal bidding process for the allocation of production in 2003. 
GM initially owned two independent subsidiaries in Europe: the British car producer 
Vauxhall with assembly in Ellesmere Port and Luton and the German car producer Opel with 
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assembly in Rüsselsheim, Bochum, and Antwerp, Belgium. GM sought to keep the two brand 
identities distinct by maintaining separate product development, design and engineering (Fetzer 
2012: 54-55).  
GM began to integrate and expand European production in the 1980s. It set up a 
European headquarters in Zurich in 1986 and then opened an engine and transmission plant in 
Vienna, an assembly plant in Saragossa, and a parts plant in France; extended the assembly plant 
in Antwerp; and bought the Swedish car company SAAB (Greer and Hauptmeier 2012). Parallel 
production became common, with the Ascona range produced in Rüsselsheim, Luton, and 
Antwerp; Corsa-based models produced in Ellesmere Port, Saragossa and Bochum; and engines 
manufactured in Vienna, Bochum and Kaiserslautern (Fetzer 2012: 56).  
At the end of the 1980s, management began to experiment with whipsawing and used 
competition between plants over production as leverage to pursue changes in labor relations and 
work organization (Mueller and Purcell 1992:20). This was informal whipsawing, since there 
was no explicit threat to shift production to another plant. In return for production allocation, the 
Saragossa plant was the first in Europe that agreed to round-the-clock production. Previously, 
three shifts a day had been regarded as physically too demanding. Similarly, the components 
plant in Kaiserslautern agreed to extended machine running times and working time flexibility in 
return for investments. This agreement was a departure from previous employment relations 
practices in Germany, since such significant working time changes had previously determined in 
sectoral bargaining (ibid.).  
GM’s whipsawing capacity increased during the 1990s with the construction of assembly 
plants in Eisenach (Germany) and Gliwice (Poland) and an engine plant in Hungary. As in other 
parts of the world, GM Europe introduced its global manufacturing system, which defined 
19 
 
common production standards, norms and practices (Laudon and Laudon 2011); implementation 
was audited by a benchmarking team that regularly assessed the progress of different plants 
(interview member benchmarking team, USA, 23.3.2004). GM standardized further by 
introducing production platforms, which were fully implemented by the late 1990s.   
These changes gave management more flexibility to shift production between plants, 
which it increasingly used to whipsaw plants and extract concessions. For example, during the 
1993 recession in the European auto market, management published benchmarking data in the 
Opel company newsletters, showing that the German plants had the highest labor costs and 
lowest annual working time of any GM plant worldwide (Opel Post 1993), but did not explicitly 
threaten labor to shift production to another plant.  Later, management unilaterally cancelled 
three collective agreements on social benefits, an unprecedented move at Opel. The works 
council sought to fight off concessions and pointed to the previously solid profits at the German 
plants. In the context of the recession, however, labor was under pressure to trade concessions 
for an employment protection clause that prohibited forced redundancies (Rehder 2003).   
In 1995 management pitched the Rüsselsheim, Antwerp and Luton plants against each 
other in the context of the Vectra allocation. In the negotiations with German works councilors, 
management pointed again to the high labor costs in Germany. Labor agreed to a ‘working time 
corridor’ that allowed weekly working time to alter between 31 and 38.75 hours, depending on 
market conditions (Opel Works Council 1995) in exchange for a share of the Vectra production. 
After concluding negotiations in Germany, GM approached the Antwerp and Luton plant, 
pointing to the productivity improvements in Germany. Management made the case to the 
Belgian and British unionists that they also had to reduce their costs, if they also wanted a 
portion of the Vectra production. As both plants urgently needed further production, they agreed 
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to labor concessions in return for a share of the Vectra production (works council interview, 
Germany, 1.11.2005). Management repeated the same type of coercive whipsawing in 1998. 
Again, management negotiated concessions at the German plants in exchange for production and 
investments then used this agreement to extract concessions from the Belgian and British plants 
(interview with Belgian unionist, EWC meeting, 4.7.2005).  
Management’s whipsawing practices led to tensions between labor representatives in 
GM’s EWC. The British labor representatives felt that the German unionists had negotiated 
behind their back and at the expense of other European plants. Accusations flew within the 
EWC, but the labor representatives also realized that the fierce whipsawing practices by 
management were ultimately responsible for the bouts of concessions bargaining in Europe in 
the 1990s (Kotthoff 2006). They responded by intensifying their transnational work in the EWC 
(Greer and Hauptmeier 2012).  
The Saragossa plant was not initially strongly affected by whipsawing due to its 
production of the Corsa, GM’s best-selling car in Europe. However, as the balance sheet of the 
plant deteriorated at the end of the 1990s, it needed a second car model to utilize the entire 
production capacity. Management offered Meriva production to Saragossa in exchange for 
concessions and productivity improvements; otherwise the new model would be assigned to the 
Gliwice plant in Poland (Hauptmeier 2012). The ensuing labor-management negotiations traded 
a reduction in labor costs for the assignment of the Meriva model to the Saragossa plant.  
In 2000, coercive whipsawing practices led to worker protests. The Bochum plant 
experienced wildcat strikes in protest of feared job losses in the context of the Fiat-GM joint 
venture. A conflict that year at the Luton plant had wider ramifications. The local strike action of 
the British unions was supported by the EWC, which organized a transnational work stoppage in 
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which 40,000 workers across Europe participated (Herber and Schäfer-Klug 2002). Management 
extracted concessions with its forcing and whipsawing practices, but also undermined 
cooperation with labor.  
Management therefore tried to make whipsawing practices fairer and more transparent. 
GM introduced a bidding process for the allocation of production for plants producing on the 
same platform in 2003. Plants interested in new production had to submit a bid, which laid out 
cost savings and labor concessions. Management would assess bids based on labor costs and 
productivity comparisons. The plant that won the tender would receive either the entire 
production of a new car models or a higher share of production than competing plants. In effect, 
management created a within company market for the allocation of production.  
Management regarded this as a fair and just process and compared it with the many 
markets that exist in advanced economies and help societies to efficiently allocate goods and 
services (management interviews, USA headquarters, 22.3.2004). The introduction of a formal 
bidding process was thus intended to increase the legitimacy of whipsawing within GM. 
However, worker representatives were not convinced and regarded the formal bidding process as 
yet another forcing strategy by management to extract labor concessions (works council 
interview, Germany, 26.5.2005).   
In 2004, GM offered the Zafira model to the Gliwice and Rüsselsheim plants in a bidding 
contest. While both offered concessions, management argued each car was 350 euros cheaper to 
produce in Poland. This was a major blow for the German worker representatives, as production 
was only at 70% of capacity and the Rüsselsheim plant urgently needed another product (works 
council interview, Germany, 3.5.2005). In 2005, management whipsawed the Saragossa and 
Gliwice plants over the new Meriva model. In this case, competitive pressures increased when 
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the bidding process became public in Saragossa. Management provided the local newspapers 
with the benchmarking data of the two plants. The local public anxiously followed the outcome 
due to the importance of the GM plant for the local economy. Ultimately, the Spanish unions 
won after agreeing to concessions (UGT GM 2005). A further bidding process took place 
between Rüsselsheim and Trollhättan in 2005. Management assessed the total production costs 
as 200 million euros cheaper in Rüsselsheim, and the plant received the new Vectra (works 
council interviews, Germany, 18.4.2005).  
  In another round of tendering, GM pitched the plants of the Delta platform against each 
other. European management asked the plants in Ellesmere Port, Antwerp, Bochum, Trollhätten, 
and Gliwice to submit bids for Astra production. The EWC sought to counter this transnational 
whipsawing through intensified transnational worker cooperation and demanded that 
management negotiate jointly a fair and egalitarian distribution of production that would allow 
all plants to survive. Supported by the European Metal Workers Federation, the EWC founded 
the Delta Group in which worker representatives at each plant signed a ‘solidarity pledge’ 
stipulating that no plant would engage in individual negotiations with management and underbid 
other plants (Bartmann and Blum-Geenen 2006).   
Management interpreted the Delta Group as a ‘declaration of war’ and gross interference 
with the right to manage (management interview, GM Europe Headquarters, 29.5.2005). The 
explicit goal of management became to break the common labor negotiation block, which was 
achieved through  a secret deal with the Bochum works council. Management’s effort to secure 
legitimacy through rule-based whipsawing was not notably successful, although it did divide the 
workforce and lead to further labor concessions. 
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Volkswagen 
VW was a late adopter of whipsawing and initially used informal whipsawing, which evolved 
into a pattern of hegemonic whipsawing. Management’s attempts to convince labor that 
whipsawing was necessary were successful, and labor representatives believed that the 
competitive assignment of production would help the plants to stay productive and defend jobs. 
However, VW periodically resorted to coercive whipsawing practices when faced with an 
intransigent local workforce. 
VW’s European operations are concentrated in Germany, with headquarters in 
Wolfsburg. VW began expanding in Europe in the 1970s by building a plant in Belgium in 1971 
and in Yugoslavia in 1972, by taking over the Spanish auto company SEAT in the 1980s and the 
Czech company Škoda in 1991 and by engaging in a joint venture with Ford in Portugal in 1995. 
Despite a long tradition of labor-management partnership, labor representatives became 
concerned with increasing labor competition within Europe in the late 1980s, which spurred the 
foundation of one of the first EWCs in 1992 and a World Works Council (WWC) in 1999.  
Whipsawing at VW only emerged in the 1990s. A recession of the European auto market 
began in 1992, and when it became apparent that VW was drifting towards crisis, the supervisory 
board appointed a new CEO, Ferdinand Piëch, who was tasked to restructure VW. He 
implemented production platforms from 1993, which cut across the brands Škoda, VW, Audi and 
SEAT (Jürgens 1998; Piëch 2002), and ended production in SEAT’s assembly plant in 
Barcelona.  
In addition, management sought to tackle labor costs. Workers in Germany were only 
able to avoid redundancies through agreeing to far-reaching working time reduction and 
flexibility. As part of the drive to reduce labor costs, management considered the assignment of 
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the production of a new model, the Lupo, to the VW Pamplona plant in Spain in 1995 (Haipeter 
2000). Previously, all new VW car models had been initially produced in Germany and then only 
assigned to foreign plants later in the product cycle. In order to avoid the assignment to a foreign 
plant, labor in Germany agreed to labor concessions, amongst them further working time 
flexibility measures. Given the contentious labor relations at VW’s Pamplona plant, however, it 
was unclear whether management seriously intended to assign the new car there.  
By the late 1990s, however, the standardization of production and the development of 
platforms gave VW more flexibility to shift car production and to assign new car models to 
different plants. In 1999, VW management assigned the new car model Touareg, a small SUV, to 
the Bratislava plant. This showed that VW management was serious about taking advantage of 
lower foreign labor costs and that foreign plants were up to the task of rolling out high-end car 
models (interview industry expert, Germany, 19.5.2005).  
VW also introduced a bidding process for the sourcing of parts in 1999, which pitted 
internal suppliers against external competitors, by allowing both to submit tenders. If an external 
supplier offered to produce at lower costs, the internal VW supplier had the chance for a final bid 
to undercut the external supplier. This process radically reduced the labor costs at VW parts 
plants in Germany. This formal bidding process was introduced with the consent of labor. 
Management collaborated closely with works councilors on the supervisory board and actively 
sought to convince labor of their assessment of the auto market (management interview, 
Germany, 15.12.2005). Ultimately, management and labor agreed that VW’s plants faced cut-
throat competition in the parts sector, and the bidding process helped to make the internal 
suppliers more competitive. Labor representatives preferred concessions over permanent 
25 
 
outsourcing, which they observed had happened at GM and Ford and were realistic alternatives 
(works council interviews, Germany, 19.7.2007; union interview, Germany, 12.6.2007).  
In the early 2000s, management approached labor representatives in Germany about the 
production of a new model, the Touran. Management made clear that this would only happen in 
Germany if labor agreed to a separate, lower collective bargaining agreement and proposed what 
would become the ‘5000 x 5000 project’: 5000 new jobs at 5000 German marks per month 
(about 2,500 euros), roughly 20% below the wage level of the collective bargaining agreement. 
Management sought to frame the project in a positive manner by emphasizing that the new jobs 
would go to the unemployed, and that the project served to secure industrial jobs in Germany 
(Schumann, Kuhlmann, Sanders, and Sperling 2006).  
Initially, worker representatives rejected the proposal, since it would have broken the 
collective bargaining pattern at VW for the first time. The protracted negotiation between 
management and labor received considerable attention from politicians and the news media. The 
tabloid press depicted IG Metall as a ‘job killer’. Throughout the negotiations, management 
suggested that production could go to foreign plant if labor would not agree to concessions. The 
conflict was only resolved after the German chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, intervened 
(management interview, Germany, 15.12.2005). Under mounting pressure, labor agreed to 5000 
x 5000, which created a lower-tier collective bargaining agreement in exchange for production 
allocation to Wolfsburg.  
In 2002, VW management used the increasing flexibility in their European production 
network to whipsaw the SEAT plant in Martorell, near Barcelona (Hauptmeier 2012). In contrast 
to the German plants, which had already agreed to far-reaching working time flexibility during 
the 1990s, Spanish unions fiercely resisted working time flexibility, which they regarded as an 
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important trade union gain. During collective bargaining in 2002, management threatened to 
transfer production to the VW plant in Bratislava (Slovakia). When labor once again refused to 
make concessions, management made good on its threat and transferred 10% of the Ibiza car 
production, the flagship model of the Matorell plant, to Slovakia (Artiles 2002a). This was a 
shock for the unions, and production of the Ibiza returned only two years later to Spain after 
unions agreed to more working time flexibility.  
During the next downturn of the European car market, labor in Germany was also under 
pressure to secure sufficient car production. In 2004, IG Metall agreed to a lower tier collective 
agreement, which applied to all newly employed workers. Like the 5000 x 5000 project, all 
newly employed workers earned about 20% less than the core workforce. In return for these 
concessions, labor secured production assignments to German assembly and parts plants (IG 
Metall 2004).  
In 2005, management pitted plants more directly against each other. The VW brand had 
hired Wolfgang Bernhard as a new Chief Executive Officer. As president of Chrysler in the US, 
he had overseen its restructuring as part of DaimlerChrysler. Bernhard announced that the 
production of the Tiguan would either go to Hannover (Germany) or Setubal (Portugal). 
Production was allocated to the German plant after the works council agreed to concessions. 
Bernhard also initiated the first competition between two German assembly plants: C-Coupe car 
production was offered to both the Emden and Mosel plants and won by the former (works 
council interview, Germany, 8.12.2005, Germany, 2005).  
These concessions were due to union consent rather than union weakness. Membership 
density was above 95%, and unlike German companies covered by sectoral collective 
bargaining, labor had the right to strike at the company level. Labor representatives tolerated 
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whipsawing because they shared management’s view of a highly competitive product market, in 
which the survival of the company was at stake. Whipsawing would make the plants more 
competitive and therefore help to secure jobs (works council interview, Germany, 19.7.2005).   
VW management pursued a two-pronged strategy to convince labor. First, management 
pursued close cooperation with labor, not only within the German labor relations institutions, but 
also in the EWC and WWC. The VW management took the EWC and WWC meetings seriously, 
with the CEO present at the meetings (a practice rarely seen in other EWCs). Here, management 
presented company information, including benchmarking data, to labor representatives, with an 
aim of convincing labor of the need to increase productivity and stay competitive (works council 
interview, Germany, 16.12.2005; management interview, Spain, 16.3.2006; union interview, 
Spain, 23.3.2006).  
The second element of management’s ideological work was based on excessive 
compensation of labor representatives, which was partly illegal. In 2005, it became public that 
VW had paid extremely high salaries to key labor representatives. The chairman of the WWC, 
EWC and German works council, Klaus Volkert, received an annual income of 350,000 euros 
and bonuses worth more than two million euros between 1995 and 2005 (Hartz and Kloepfer 
2007). In addition, an assistant HR manager organized brothel visits for labor representatives in 
the context of EWC and WWC meetings and flew in prostitutes from Brazil to Germany for 
Volkert. After the revelation, plant-level labor representatives expressed in interviews that this 
special treatment explained some of Volkert’s concessions to management and his acceptance of 
bidding contests between suppliers (union interview 2006, works council interviews 2005). 
While this may suggest that Volkert had been bribed, the bribery charge was not upheld in a 
German court; however, he and the highest HR manager were convicted of embezzlement.  
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Volkert’s successor was more critical of management practices, as can be seen in a 
communiqué of the WWC in 2006, which criticized whipsawing practices and reminded 
management of their obligations towards their workers (VW 2006). However, whipsawing 
persisted. For example, in 2007, VW offered the Spanish unions the Berlina model. After labor 
agreed to concessions, management assigned the car production to SEAT’s Martorell plant. 
Management’s effort to reinforce labor-management partnership by influencing workers’ ideas 
has thus survived the scandal and resulting turnover of works council leadership. 
 
Comparative Assessment 
Above, we described the variation and change in our sample over three decades. We examined 
whipsawing practice and two explanatory factors: whipsawing capacity (see table 2) and 
management labor relations strategy. Table 3 presents a comparison of the cases over this period 
along these variables, disaggregated by whipsawing episode. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Neither factor is sufficient for explaining the variation or change in whipsawing practice. 
For example, we observed informal whipsawing under conditions of medium whipsawing 
capacity at GM during the late 1980s and early 1990s and at Ford throughout the 1990s, i.e. 
where it was not always clear that management could follow through on relocation threats. 
Against a backdrop of high whipsawing capacity since the mid-1990s – i.e. where management 
clearly could follow through on relocation threats – we observed varying and changing 
whipsawing patterns. GM switched from coercive to rule-based whipsawing, and VW switched 
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from informal to coercive to hegemonic whipsawing. Furthermore, the dominant pattern at Ford 
after the 1980s remained informal whipsawing despite an increase in whipsawing capacity. 
Whipsawing capacity, however, is an important enabling factor. We do not observe it at 
VW during the 1980s or at GM prior to 1986, where production was idiosyncratic, not 
interchangeable across the multinational production network, and where the market was not yet 
saturated. Only where whipsawing capacity is medium to high do we observe whipsawing at all, 
and increases in whipsawing capacity enabled greater sophistication. While we observe informal 
and coercive whipsawing where whipsawing capacity is high or medium (all three companies 
after the early 1990s), we only witness hegemonic or rule-based whipsawing where whipsawing 
capacity is high (GM and VW after 2004, VW parts plants after 1999).  
Labor relations strategies also help to explain why, despite the overall increase in 
whipsawing capacity, whipsawing practice continued to vary. At VW, hegemonic whipsawing 
became dominant after a period of coercive whipsawing. Management engaged in ideological 
work and spent considerable effort to align the interests of the social partners by organizing 
cooperation forums at the local, national and transnational levels (EWC, WWC). At Ford, 
management sought to protect its partnership with labor, on which its transition to lean 
production was premised, by switching in the 1990s from coercive to informal whipsawing. 
Management did, however, use coercive whipsawing when faced with local strikes. GM 
management during the 1990s was less concerned with its relationship with labor and more 
focused on reducing costs through the extraction of labor concessions using coercive 
whipsawing. When this caused strikes, management tried after 2003 to increase the legitimacy of 
whipsawing through a formal bidding process.  
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Further factors that have influenced whipsawing practices beyond the two emphasized 
above include the following. In some cases union behavior mattered, for example, GM 
management introduce rule based whipsawing following transnational labor protest and Ford 
responded to local strike action in Spain by using coercive whipsawing practices. However, in 
most of the whipsawing episodes, union behavior did not have a significant impact on 
management whipsawing. In addition, the varying exposure to financial markets mattered in 
some whipsawing episodes. For example, GM faced a shareholder revolt in the early 1990s, 
which could explain the switch to more aggressive whipsawing; and the more muted whipsawing 
practices at VW at the time might be related to its relative insulation from financial markets. 
However, this would not explain the changes in whipsawing practices at GM and VW in the late 
1990s and 2000s, since exposure to financial markets did not change significantly at these 
companies.  
 
 
Conclusion 
While economic globalization increased competitive pressures similarly across all three 
companies, management developed varying whipsawing practices in response. This paper 
explains the emergence of, and differences between, whipsawing patterns through different 
management labor relations strategies and whipsawing capacities.  
The various forms of whipsawing are important for employment relations research 
because they are important tools for management engineering change in employment relations, 
spreading work practices throughout global corporate networks and loosening the constraints 
associated with national institutions. Management in the auto industry could, for example, push 
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through alien concepts such as multi-tier wage structures in Germany, working-time flexibility in 
Spain, and implement the principles and norms of global manufacturing systems across borders.  
The extent of whipsawing in other sectors and world-regions remains an open question. 
Taken separately, the practices discussed above – the international integration and 
standardization of production, underpinned by benchmarking, capital mobility, and the search for 
labor concessions – are far from unique to the European auto sector. The same goes for the 
problems of saturated markets and production overcapacities. Future research examining how 
and why market competition is staged differently in other contexts could therefore uncover 
additional patterns of whipsawing.   
How will management whipsawing in the auto industry develop in the future? On the one 
hand, automakers might become content with wages, social benefits and working conditions 
once they reach a low level, and then institutionalize them using multi-employer bargaining. This 
would provide stability and protect firms from union whipsawing in the event of an increase in 
workers’ collective power. Alternatively, and this seems more likely, management could develop 
whipsawing on a global scale. During the period of our study, international whipsawing took 
place at the scale of the world-region, such as Europe or North America, and relocation of 
production between continents was constrained by varying quality standards, trade barriers, and 
transportation costs. This is changing, however, due to the continuing global integration of 
markets and production platforms. Under these conditions, management could pitch plants from 
South America and Asia against those in North America and Europe in global contests for 
production and investment. 
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Table 1: Four patterns of whipsawing 
  
Associated  
practice 
 Informal Coercive Rule-based Hegemonic 
Benchmarking  yes yes yes yes 
Organizing competition  
between plants 
 yes/no yes yes yes 
Explicit and specific 
 threat to shift 
production 
 no yes yes yes 
Formal bidding   no no yes yes/no  
Influencing ideas  no no  no yes 
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Table 2: The determinants of whipsawing capacity  
 Parallel 
production 
Standar- 
dization 
Production 
Platform 
Market 
demand 
Market 
supply 
Plant 
utilization 
High yes high yes low to 
medium 
high excess 
supply 
underutilized 
Medium yes low to  
high 
no  low to 
medium  
some excess 
supply  
some spare  
capacity 
Low no low no high market  
clearance 
full capacity 
utilization 
 
 
 
 Table 3: Whipsawing episodes 
 
 
 
Episode Whip- 
sawing 
capacity
3
 
Labor 
relations 
strategy 
Whip- 
sawing 
pattern 
Episode Whip-
sawing 
capacity 
Labor  
relations 
strategy 
Whip-
sawing 
pattern 
Episode Whip- 
sawing 
capacity 
Labor  
relations  
strategy 
Whip- 
sawing 
pattern 
1980s 1990s 2000s 
 
F
o
rd
 
  
 
UK & Germany 
1985 
 
UK & elsewhere 
1988 
 
 
 
M 
 
 
emphasis  
on 
forcing 
 
 
 
coercive 
Germany & 
elsewhere 
1993 
 
M 
 
emphasis  
on 
partnership 
 
 
informal 
 
 
 
 
Germany and  
Spain 2006 
 
 
 
H 
 
 
emphasis  
on  
partnership 
 
 
 
 
informal  Germany & 
elsewhere 
1997; 
Spain & 
Germany 1998 
 
 
H 
forcing  coercive 
G
M
 
 
Spain & 
elsewhere 
1988;  
 
Germany and 
elsewhere  
1988 
 
 
 
M 
 
 
emphasis  
on 
partnership 
 
 
 
 
informal 
Germany & 
elsewhere 
1993 
 
M 
emphasis  
on 
partnership 
 
informal 
UK & elsewhere 
2000; Spain and 
Poland 2001 
 
 
 
H 
emphasis  
on  
forcing  
 
coercive  
 
 
UK, Belgium, 
UK 1995; 
Germany, UK, 
Belgium 1998 
 
 
H 
 
emphasis  
on 
forcing 
 
 
coercive  
Germany & Poland 
2004; Poland & Spain 
2005; Germany-
Sweden 2005; 
Europe-wide 2005-
2006 
 
Simul-
taneous  
partnership  
and forcing 
 
 
rule-based 
V
W
 
 
 
 
 
 
-- 
 
 
 
 
L 
 
 
 
emphasis  
on 
partnership 
 
 
 
 
-- 
 
Germany & 
Spain 1995 
 
 
 
 
H 
emphasis  
on 
partnership  
 
informal 
 
Germany & 
elsewhere 2000; 
Spain & Slovakia 
2002 
 
 
 
 
H 
emphasis  
on 
forcing  
 
coercive 
 
German 
suppliers after 
1999 
 
Simul-
taneous 
partnership 
and forcing 
 
 
rule-
based 
 
Germany & 
elsewhere 2004; 
Portugal & Germany 
2005; Within 
Germany 2005; Spain 
& elsewhere 2007 
 
 
strong  
partnership 
 
 
 
hege-
monic 
 
                                                 
3
 High (H), medium (M) and low (L) whipsawing capacity (see table 2). 
